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Models and Simulations in Material Science:
Two Cases Without Error Bars
Sylvia Wenmackers∗ and Danny E. P. Vanpoucke†
Abstract
We discuss two research projects in material science in which the
results cannot be stated with an estimation of the error: a spectro-
scopic ellipsometry study aimed at determining the orientation of
DNA molecules on diamond and a scanning tunneling microscopy
study of platinum-induced nanowires on germanium. To investigate
the reliability of the results, we apply ideas from the philosophy of
models in science. Even if the studies had reported an error value, the
trustworthiness of the result would not depend on that value alone.
1 Introduction
Material science is an interdisciplinary branch of science, mainly populated
by experimental and computational physicists, chemists, biomedical scien-
tists, and engineers. They work in large research groups and consortia, on
topics such as semiconductors, nanostructured materials, photovoltaic cells,
and bioelectronics. When philosophers discuss physics, they often focus on
issues in theoretical physics, rather than topics in solid state physics and ma-
terial science. Yet, this type of research brings about its own philosophical
questions, some of which we will address in this paper. Like all empirical
sciences, material research requires the confrontation and combination of ex-
perimental findings with theoretical entities, including models. Other issues,
however, are strongly case-specific. For that reason, we structure our paper
around two case studies. Only recently did philosophers shift their focus
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from scientific theories to models, and from pure, theoretical branches of sci-
ence to experimental and interdisciplinary fields. The topic of the current
paper—models in material physics—remains wide open for exploration.
Statisticians typically deal with ‘empirical models’: mathematical models
that describe data sets, without a scientific background theory about how the
data relate to reality. Experimental physicists, on the other hand, usually
analyze their data on the basis of ‘physical models’, which are derived—in a
non-trivial way—from physical theories, such as classical mechanics, quan-
tum mechanics, optics, or the like. In material science, statistical and phys-
ical modeling go hand-in-hand. Therefore, in the context of this article, it
does not suffice to discuss empirical models alone. We need a broader frame-
work that encompasses all types of ‘models in science’, including empirical
as well as scientific models.
In section 2, we review existing work on models in science by philosophers.
Philosophy of science does not claim to offer a general classification of models,
so it should not come as a surprise when we encounter some lacunae along
the way.
In section 3, we deal with two cases in material science which were the
topics of the doctoral study of the first and second author (Wenmackers,
2008, Vanpoucke, 2009). For each case, we introduce the research question,
the methodology, and the obtained result. In both cases, the result cannot be
stated with an estimation of the error (albeit for different reasons), leading
to questions about the reliability of the results. To answer these questions,
we look into the particulars of each case and analyze the work flow. We
observe that they involve a complex interplay of scientific theories and mod-
els. By making explicit which models are involved, we try to establish the
trustworthiness of the results of both cases.
In section 4, we give a general discussion of the cases and distil common
conclusions, most of which hold for material science in general.
2 Philosophy of models in science
Recent case studies on the use of models in specific branches of science—such
as Guillemot (2010) and Parker (2010) on climate science, Beven and Wester-
berg (2011) on hydrology, and Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2009) and Phan and Varenne
(2010) on sociology—show the diversity of models, which involve creative
and highly case-specific elements. Hence, any classification of models is nec-
essarily incomplete: the distinctions in it are not mutually exclusive, and the
way of categorizing never unique. This wild variation, which is intrinsic to
the topic of modeling, may be part of the reason why philosophers of science
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have traditionally focused on scientific theories rather than models. Any phi-
losophy that would claim to offer an all-encompassing theory of models in
science should be treated with proper suspicion. Moreover, it would be a pity
if such a classification would be misunderstood as a normative device, thus
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, blocking some of the intellectual plasticity
badly needed in the practice of modeling.
2.1 Semantics, epistemology, and ontology of models
Although philosophy of science does not offer a full-blown theory of models
in science, it does provide us with some tools for the conceptual analysis of
models that are used in statistics (such as mathematical models and models of
data) and in material physics (such as material models). In their encyclopedia
article, Frigg and Hartmann (2006) discuss the scientific models from the
perspective of philosophy of science. Here, we give a short overview of their
take on the semantics, epistemology, and ontology of models in science, to
enable easy reference in the discussion of the case studies.
The semantics of scientific models deals with the question: what do models
represent? One way of answering this question, is to distinguish between
models that (a) represent a part of the world, and (b) those that describe a
part of a theory. This is a useful distinction, even though some models may
do (a) and (b) simultaneously. In case (a), the relevant part of the world
is called the ‘target system’, which may consist of (a1) phenomena or (a2)
data (again, not mutually exclusive). In case (a1), the corresponding model
is called a ‘model of phenomena’, in case (a2), a ‘model of data’. Models
of data are the most relevant category of models in statistics. Observe that
scientists almost never apply statistics to ‘raw data’: there always is an
element of selection, and sometimes correction, involved. In other words,
the data sets that are used in a statistical analysis are ‘clean data’, which
serve as a model of the raw data. It is also in the context of (a2) that the
curve-fitting problem appears.
The epistemology of scientific models deals with the question: how can
we learn from models? It seems clear that we can learn how a model works:
by working with a simple mathematical model for mechanics, for instance,
we can learn how to solve the equations of motion, thereby learning some-
thing about the model of motion. But ultimately, we want to learn something
about the world; the model is only a means to that end.1 Given that a model
1There are exceptions. Although almost all models are intended to represent something
in reality, some mathematical models are simplified so much that they clearly do not
represent anything in reality. These ‘toy models’ are studied for their own sake, rather
than to learn about the world.
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is distinct from its target system, it is not immediately clear how we can learn
about the world by manipulating the model. Hughes (1997) proposes a way
to describe the process of learning about the world via a model. He dis-
tinguishes between three phases in the process: denotation, demonstration,
and interpretation. (In practice, these steps need not be clearly distinct and
are not to be understood as three consecutive steps: going back-and-forth
between the steps may occur.) In the denotation phase, certain features of
the world are related to elements of the model. For example, it is decided
that the symbol v in the model shall represent the velocity of an object in
the world. The demonstration phase takes place entirely in the model, and
consists of activities such as learning, predicting, and explaining. In the in-
terpretation phase, what has been learned (predicted, explained, etc.) in the
model is translated into corresponding statement about the world (by means
of the relations established in the denotation phase). So, in a sense, this is
the opposite move of the denotation phase.
The ontological question concerning scientific models is: what are models?
Frigg and Hartmann (2006) consider a distinction between material models
and ideal models. Examples of material models, also called iconic models,
include scaled-up or scaled-down replicas of the target system, and samples
(or specimens). A sample is a representative element of a larger group of el-
ements of interest. One may think of biological or medical studies, in which
in order to study an entire species or a certain type of patients, respectively,
one or a limited number of representative elements (members of the species
or patients) is studied. The sample is also important in material physics, as
we will see in the case studies: there, ‘sample’ has a slightly different mean-
ing, as it is something that is specially prepared, rather than selected. Ideal
models are immaterial models, conceptual by nature, such as descriptions,
thought experiments, and mathematical models. The same ideal model may
be represented in multiple ways: as a text, a schematic drawing, a set of
equations or matrices, and so on. An important subset of ideal models in
statistics, material physics, and all other branches of science are mathemat-
ical models. In this paper, by ‘simulation’ we shall refer to an instance of a
mathematical model.
2.2 All models are wrong
After this short review of the questions considered by Frigg and Hartmann
(2006), we already have a good basis to reflect about the question implied by
the conference title: Are all models wrong? As a first observation, notice that
only a number of features of the target system are considered to be relevant
for a given research context and that the model only represents those. Hence,
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all models are approximations. If neglecting all other features of the target
and its relations to other parts of the world turns out to be inconsequential
to the features under study, the model is useful. No model is exactly like its
target in every aspect; so, under the highest epistemic standards, all models
are wrong.
The intended function of a model is to create something that is easier
to understand or to manipulate than the target. Many additional approxi-
mations are built into the model intentionally: additional steps away from
reality may be required to make the model better suited for educational or
computational purposes. Idealizations are a special type of approximations:
parameters that are known to have some influence on the target system may
still be left out of the model because otherwise the model becomes too com-
plex to be useful. Whereas increasing the difference between a model and
its target system may have the advantage that the model becomes easier to
study, studying a model is ultimately aimed at learning something about the
target system. Therefore, additional approximations come with the cost of
making the correspondence between model and target system less straight-
forward. Ultimately, this makes the interpretation of results on the model in
terms of the target system more problematic. We should keep in mind the
advice of Whitehead (1920, p. 163): “Seek simplicity and distrust it.”
A ‘good model’ is to be understood as a model that achieves an equi-
librium between being useful and not being too wrong. The usefulness of
a model is clearly context-dependent; it may involve a combination of de-
sired features such as being understandable (for students, researchers, or
others), achieving computational tractability, and other criteria. ‘Not being
too wrong’ is to be understood as ‘not being too different from reality’. How-
ever, we can never establish the exact difference between the target system
and our model for it: we can measure differences between models (e.g. com-
pare how well they match a set of data), but we can never be sure that the
parameters we have selected to do so apply to reality at all. It is well-know
by statisticians that there are different measures for the distance between
models (such as the likelihood) and that different information criteria may
rank models differently. One may try to summarize the overall quality of
each model by a single figure of merit, by attaching relative weights to the
various criteria. The choice of these weights, however, is again open for de-
bate, and even if a consensus could be reached on this matter, ex aequo’s are
possible.
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3 Two cases in material science
3.1 Case A: Ellipsometry of DNA on diamond
Our first case study in material science is based on the paper of Wenmackers
et al. (2008); it is part of a larger project which focuses on diamond coatings
as a platform material for biosensors, in particular DNA sensors (Wenmackers
et al., 2009). Single stranded (ss-) DNA probes with a known sequence are
covalently attached to the sensor surface with one end. When patient DNA
is brought into contact with the bio-functionalized surface, the patient DNA
will only bind to the probes, thereby forming double stranded (ds-) DNA,
provided that they are of the complementary sequence. When binding is
detected, the sequence of the patient DNA can be deduced from it.
An important parameter that influences sensor performance is the orien-
tation of the DNA probes: only if the probes are directed upwards, extending
from the surface into the buffer fluid, they are available for hybridization to
patient DNA. In this case study, the main research question is: “What is the
average angle between the backbone of the probe DNA and the plane of the
sensor surface?”
The characterization method chosen to answer this question was spectro-
scopic ellipsometry (SE). Ellipsometry monitors the change in polarization
when light interacts with a material interface and is highly surface sensitive.
In an ellipsometry measurement, two parameters are recorded: the ampli-
tude ratio, tan(ψ), and the phase shift, ∆ (Arwin, 2000). Using light of a
fixed wavelength, ellipsometry can be used to determine a single unknown
layer thickness. By performing the measurement for a whole spectrum of
wavelengths, one can derive additional information from the data, such as
the orientation of the molecules in a layer.
Various structures in DNA molecules absorb at specific wavelengths in the
ultraviolet to visible (UV-Vis) range. In particular, DNA can absorb wave-
lengths of 261 nm (corresponding to an energy of 4.74 eV); this absorption is
associated to a pi-pi∗ electronic transition (in which the orbitals change from
bonding to non-bonding) in the bases of the DNA. The conformational sen-
sitivity of the technique originates from the spatial orientation of the dipole
moment associated with the selected excitation.
SE is an indirect measurement technique. In the words of Fujiwara (2007,
p. 2–3): “[e]llipsometry data analysis requires an optical model defined by
the optical constants and layer thicknesses of a sample. In an extreme case,
one has to construct an optical model even when the sample structure is not
clear at all.” An important optical constant is the complex refractive index
(for a specific material and for a fixed wavelength) N = n + ik, with n the
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Figure 1: Three-layer optical model for an organic layer on diamond.
real-valued refractive index and k the extinction coefficient.
In this case, the model consists of three layers, as depicted in Figure 1: the
diamond phase (bulk), the organic layer, and the ambient phase (vacuum).
By comparing the in-plane and out-of-plane contributions to the 261 nm
absorption of the DNA bases and based on the optical model, the average
angle of the DNA bases can be calculated. The complement of that angle, α,
is taken to be the average angle of the DNA molecules, the sought parameter.
The result is that α = 45◦ for ss-DNA of 8 bases long, α = 49◦ for ss-DNA
of 36 bases long, and α = 52◦ for ds-DNA of 29 base pairs long.
In SE studies, the goodness-of-fit of the spectra of tan(ψ) and ∆ as a
function of the wavelength is usually assessed both quantitatively and qual-
itatively. For the quantitative part, fitting errors are calculated based on a
least-squares method (Fujiwara, 2007, p. 199). Additionally, a qualitative
assessment is done by plotting the experimental spectra together with the
simulated spectra on one graph, to check whether they have the same overall
shape, in particular in the region with the absorption(s) of interest. Because
of the complexity of the calculations, however, ellipsometry studies typically
do not report an error for the obtained values of the parameters in the optical
model and the derived parameters, such as the tilt angle, α.
This prompts the question: how reliable is the result? Is the probe ss-
DNA of 8 bases really oriented under 45◦ as compared to the plane of the
sensor surface? Although α is a parameter derived from the optical model, it
is interpreted in a straightforward and realistic way: as the average angle of
the length-direction of the DNA molecules on the diamond surface. In order
to investigate whether this direct identification is warranted or not, we have
to inspect all the measurements, models, and assumptions that lead to the
determination of this parameter; this is done in section 3.3.
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3.2 Case B: STM of nanowires on germanium
Our second case study is based on the paper of Vanpoucke and Brocks
(2010a). It is part of a larger research project which aims at the miniaturiza-
tion of computer chips: atomically small wires and devices are the ultimate
goal in this endeavor. The study focuses on the mono-crystalline germanium
surface Ge(001), and its behavior when small amounts of platinum (Pt) are
deposited. Scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) observations show that af-
ter high temperature annealing of such samples, single-atom wide nanowires
(NWs) appear on the surface (Gu¨rlu¨ et al., 2003).
STM is a type of scanning probe microscopy in which an atomically sharp
tip is brought in close vicinity of the studied surface and then scans over it.
A bias applied between the tip and the surface results in a tunneling current.
The tunneling current is kept constant by a feedback loop which adjusts the
height of the probe, resulting in a two-dimensional height map. The height
map can be interpreted as a direct reflection of the topology of the sample
surface. Although STM can determine the surface topography with atomic
resolution, it cannot determine which chemical elements are present. Due
to this lack of chemical sensitivity, the experimenters have to rely on their
intuition and circumstantial evidence (such as adsorption experiments with
CO, O¨ncel et al., 2006) to speculate about the chemical nature of the NWs.
Although they refer to the structures as ‘platinum nanowires’, it would be
safer to call them platinum-induced nanowires until further information on
their composition is available.
The aim of the theoretical study of this system is to determine the chem-
ical nature of the NWs and to clarify the mechanism of their formation. In
order to do this, a set of atomic structures is proposed; one such atomic
structure is shown in Figure 2.a. Starting from each structure, a theoretical
STM image is calculated and compared to the experimentally obtained im-
ages. The features that match the experimental images best are then used
to create a new set of atomic structures, for which STM images can be cal-
culated. This loop is iterated a few times, leading to the model structure
of Figure 2.b: the simulated STM images based on this model show all the
relevant features present in the experimental images. The conclusion of this
study is that the deposited Pt atoms exchange positions with Ge atoms in
the surface layer. This results in Ge NWs on a Pt-modified surface. In
conclusion, the observed nanowires consist of germanium.
In this case, the research question and the corresponding answer are of
a qualitative rather than quantitative nature. Although the analysis does
rely heavily on quantitative information, no quantitative error can be given.
Again, the question is: how reliable is this result? Are the observed nanos-
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Figure 2: Atomistic models of Pt-induced nanowires on Ge(001). Ge/Pt
atoms are indicated in blue/yellow. (a) The experimental model involves
Pt dimers on top of the Ge surface. (b) In the final theoretical model, the
Pt atoms diffuse into the subsurface, pushing up some Ge atoms. These
dislocated Ge atoms appear as NWs in the simulated STM images.
tructures really made of germanium?
3.3 Scientific models in cases A and B
As we have seen in section 2, a model can describe a target system, which is
to be understood as a part of the world. The targets of these case studies are
(data associated with) a diamond-based DNA sensor and a nanowire-based
chip: objects which do not actually exist (yet) and therefore are not parts of
the world. This situation, in which the target system itself is an ideal model,
is quite common in material science and engineering.
What does exist in the material world are samples, which serve as precur-
sors or prototypes of the DNA sensor or NW-chip in development. Should
we consider these samples as the target system, then? No, the sample in turn
is a material model, representing something more than itself: it is thought
of as a typical representative of a larger class of samples that are or could be
produced by the same protocol.
The protocol is a list of manipulations that have to be performed in order
to produce a sample (diamond with probe DNA or Ge with NWs). Although
it is likely that the protocol itself requires further optimization, it does serve
as an ideal model: it is a model of how the actual preparation, which results
in the sample that is actually measured, should be carried out.
For the unaided eye, it is usually not possible to verify if the protocol
has worked. In case A, the SE measurement required scarce beam time at a
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synchrotron facility (BESSY II in Berlin). Therefore, preliminary tests were
performed to verify the presence of DNA on the samples: fluorescence mi-
croscopy, atomic force microscopy (AFM), and contact angle measurements
(Wenmackers et al., 2008). To avoid contaminating the actual samples, it is
possible to prepare additional samples in parallel with the ones that are to
be used in the actual SE experiment. The additional control samples serve
as a material model for the actual sample, which in turn is a model for the
DNA sensor, which is an ideal model of a device that does not exist yet.
The disadvantage of this option is that one cannot verify the inter-sample
variability and has to assume that the samples are essentially equal; in terms
of statistics, the various samples should at least be describable by the same
distribution. Notice that doing the preliminary tests on the actual sample
does not always get rid of the representativity problem: most microscopic
techniques can only image a small part of the total sample surface, and thus
it has to be assumed that the tested area was representative for the whole
sample.
Once the samples are prepared and the initial tests have proven positive,
the actual characterization method can be applied. Both UV-Vis SE and
STM require a complex apparatus. Although the actual measurement process
is an interesting topic in its own right, we just assume here that this part
is completed successfully: one has collected many spectra or images—the
raw data—typically more than one will be able to analyze. The researcher
now has to select the ‘good’ spectra or images, according to criteria which
are qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. The selected spectra or
images are called the clean data, and can be regarded as a model of the raw
data.
We have seen that case A relies on an optical model, consisting of three-
layers, and that case B involves an atomistic model: a specification of the
positions of the various atoms and their chemical species. Let us now exam-
ine how these models are constructed. They are clearly not empirical models,
since they are not constructed solely by working with the clean data. Rather,
the models are constructed largely independent of the data and depend on
an interplay between other sources of information: (1) on the experimental
method and (2) on the sample. Type (1) information tells us which is the
relevant background theory (optics for case A, quantum mechanics for case
B) and how the measurement apparatus is designed. Type (2) information
includes knowledge of the protocol, logbook entries from the actual execution
of the protocol, and the outcome of preliminary tests. From these different
sources of information, the models are derived. It is clear that there is no al-
gorithm for turning the information into a suitable model. There are degrees
of freedom, and within the bounds of this freedom, experience and heuristics
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play a role in the development of the model.
For case A, the optical model can be considered to be a mathematical
model with parameters. Whereas the number of variables in empirical models
of statistics is usually determined by employing an information criterion (IC),
this practice is not applied in physics. The background theory leaves room
for a number of parameters, which all have a physical interpretation, such
as a layer thickness or the spatial orientation of electrical dipole moment
associated with a specific absorption. It may be the case that the number
of parameters is too large to be calculated from a single spectrum. In that
case, additional measurements may be done to gather more information. (For
example, measure a bare diamond surface to establish the optical constants
for the bulk material.) If the number of variables is still too large, it can be
reduced further by idealizing the model. In the optical model of case A, the
layer roughnesses of diamond and DNA are deliberately excluded: the model
is made less realistic in order to make the calculations lighter (or to make
them possible at all). In other words, idealizations and other approximations
make the model more wrong, in order to make it (more) useful. However,
such deliberate ‘errors of omission’ (cf. Beven and Westerberg, 2011) may
backfire in the interpretation step, as we will see in section 3.5.
Underlying the atomistic model for case B there is a realistic assumption:
the assumption that there exists a certain spatial organization of atoms which
is the cause for the observed structures in the STM images. Based on the
experimental conditions, it is also assumed that the atoms belong only to two
different species (Ge and Pt). Although the model depends on the Pt/Ge-
fraction, this numerical variable does not fully determine the model. Propos-
ing an atomic model for a NW is not a matter of changing the composition
of a fixed matrix, since the available positions (in the crystal and on surface
adsorption sites) change with the composition. Hence, the model in case B
is not parametric in the usual sense. The simulated STM image is calculated
based on quantum mechanics (QM), a powerful and well-established physical
theory. Yet, the practical application of QM requires many idealizations and
approximations to be made. Firstly, density functional theory (DFT) is an
approximative theory used in order to make QM practically applicable to
many-body systems (such as the Ge surface of case B). Secondly, instead of
explicitly taking tunneling into account, the simulation only calculates an
isosurface of charge density, which is assumed to be equivalent to the height
profile in a constant-current STM image. This is equivalent to modeling the
STM tip as an ideal point source, but with the advantage of requiring less
computation. A third way of reducing the computational cost is using only
a small number of atoms and applying periodic boundary conditions. The
resulting surface then consists of exact copies of the same small surface unit,
11
clearly an unrealistic model assumption.
The models can be represented in different ways. In case A, the optical
model can be represented as a schematic drawing (as in Figure 1), or as 4×4
Mueller matrices, for instance. The model of case B can be represented as a
list of coordinates, to be used by a computer algorithm, or as a ball-and-stick
image (as in Figure 2). We regard these different representations as the same
model. The use of these models for simulation and fitting is discussed in the
two following subsections.
3.4 Statistical procedures in cases A and B
By assuming certain values for the model parameters, the optical model
can be used to obtain simulated spectra. The fitting procedure consists of
identifying those parameter values that fit the experimental spectrum (from
the clean data) best. Additional calculations on these best-fit parameter
values ultimately lead to a value for α. Stripping away the particulars, leads
us to this abstract presentation of case A:
(A1) Assume a model M with the main parameter of interest, α.
(A2) Given the protocol P that generates the data and given the model M ,
estimate α by αˆ.
Since the model M may be wrong, the uncertainty about α is larger than
the internal error in αˆ. The latter observation happens on a meta-level as
compared to the statistical modeling of steps (A1) and (A2); typically, on
such a meta-level less quantitative tools are available and we have to resort
to qualitative modes of critical thinking.
For case B, the algorithm is more complex:
(B1) Experimental data, D, are collected under (uncertain) experimental
conditions, θ. Initialize trial counter: i = 1.
(B2) Make assumptions, θ′i, about the experimental conditions θ and pro-
pose a model Mi that is consistent with these assumptions. At i = 1,
only the partial information on the experimental conditions is used to
generate (θ′i,Mi); for i > 1, previous outcomes of step (B4) are also
taken into account.
(B3) Use Mi to simulate data, D
′
i.
(B4) Compare features of D′i to features in the experimental data D.
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(B5) If the match in (B4) is insufficient, propose changes to Mi for the next
trial, add 1 to the trial counter, i, and return to step (B2). If the match
is sufficient, accept Mi.
Although we assume that there exists a true model (see next subsection),
there is no guarantee that it is the selected model Mi. The reason is twofold:
we start from incomplete information about θ and we can only explore a
small fraction of all possible models. Yet, we do not know how to quantify
the likelihood of Mi.
Marjoram et al. (2003) discuss the situation in which no likelihoods are
available. In particular, algorithm F with step (F3) replaced by (F”3) in their
paper resembles the above structure of our case B. Let us briefly discuss three
key elements.
Firstly, the generation of a simulated STM image in step (B3) corresponds
directly to step (F2).
Secondly, the experimental and simulated data in case B consist of STM
images (height maps), but step (B4) mentions ‘features’ of these experimen-
tal and simulated data. Examples of such features are the relative positions
of peaks and valleys, their relative heights, and the presence of symmetric
bulges. Experience learns us that small changes in the modeling settings
result in few changes in these features of the resulting STM images, although
the absolute height and shape of the peaks may change severely. A similar
idea is known in the statistics literature as Approximate Bayesian Compu-
tation (ABC): the relevant features are called a ‘set of statistics’. The idea
of ABC, also present in step (F3”), is to measure the distance between the
statistics of the experimental and simulated data, S and S ′, rather than be-
tween the data, D and D′, directly. Whereas (F3”) assumes the existence of
a metric to compare the difference between the experimental and simulated
data, in our case, the resemblance was judged by a human observer, resulting
in a qualitative rather than a quantitative judgement. It is straightforward
to compute the distance between two height maps (an experimental and a
simulated STM image), but a quantitative comparison of the relevant fea-
tures in two such images is currently out of reach; it would require substantial
input from the domain of computer vision.
Thirdly, step (B1) and (B5) embed steps (B2)–(B4) in a cyclical learning
loop. Likewise, step (F1) and (F4—(F5) embed steps (F2) and (F”3) in a
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. Unlike in MCMC, in our case
the new model has to be constructed by hand, something which could be
considered as a poor man’s MCMC method. The reason for this is twofold:
the phase space is huge and our models are not parametric (as discussed in
section 3.3). Also observe that θ′i are assumptions about the experimental
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conditions, not just model parameters in the usual sense: they leave the
associated model, Mi, underdetermined. Since case B is not based on a
parametric model, it also does not allow us to express the probability of the
selected model in terms of a prior over model parameters as in step (F4).
In conclusion, although the structure of our case B resembles the F”-
scheme as discussed by Marjoram et al. (2003), it lacks the quantifiable ele-
ments (algorithmic transition kernel in the MCMC, distance metric between
the statistics, prior over model parameters). However, future developments,
in computer learning and automatized image recognition, could supplement
our current method with quantification. If the genetic algorithm for automat-
ing the procedure existed, it could associate a figure of merit to the selected
atomistic model. But even then, a broader discussion of the reliability of
the result would be necessary. For instance, it would still depend on our im-
plementation to which features the computer is sensitive, and how it weighs
their relative importance. Although it is a positive step to objectify the cri-
teria, the criteria for choosing a particular set of weighted criteria remain
open for discussion. This shows that automating model selection processes
and quantifying their result by figures of merit (or error) does not eradicate
all the associated philosophical questions; they merely obfuscate them.
3.5 Physical realism in cases A and B
Let us now return to the question regarding the physical interpretation of
the statistical results. Is the estimate for the indirect parameter α in case A
really the tilt angle of the DNA molecules? Does the selected atomic model
in case B correspond to the real configuration of atoms in the NW?
Given the complexity of the whole process (from sample preparation, over
measurement, to data analysis), there are many occasions for something to
go wrong (cf. Ioannidis, 2005). Reliability of the results requires at the very
least that the experimental observations are reproducible. This minimal
robustness condition is satisfied for both case A and case B. In case B, also
the theoretical model was tested further by verifying that its results are
consistent with the CO adsorption experiments of O¨ncel et al. (2006), which
is indeed the case (Vanpoucke and Brocks, 2010b).
The real issue of interest is something else: the various model assump-
tions, errors of omission, and idealizations harm the realism of the model and
the direct, physical interpretation of the results. In the end, it does not seem
possible to assess to what extent α (in case A) and the atomic configuration
(in case B) are more than empirical parameters from a statistical model;
the models are intended to have a direct realistic interpretation, but all the
tricks that were necessary to arrive at them have complicated—and possibly
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compromised—the relation between reality and those models. As Fujiwara
(2007, p. 197) points out: “an optical model used in ellipsometry analysis
merely represents an approximated sample structure, and obtained results
are not necessarily correct even when the fit is sufficiently good.” Even if it
is assumed that there is a correct model (as in case B), the applied model
may still be wrong if an assumption about the experimental conditions was
wrong, if some approximation was unwarranted, or if the scientist just did not
come up with the right type of model. If so, it is hard to establish whether
the model is just slightly off, or completely wrong.
This seems to be a very strong concession: how can physics still claim to
provide a method for learning about the world, if the very models it uses just
obfuscate the relation to the world? The answer is that scientific knowledge
does not depend on a single experiment, performed by one group of scientists
with a single technique. Additional information from independent sources is
required to elucidate the relation between the physical parameter of interest
and the model parameter.
Observe that if we had computed the error on αˆ, it would only have in-
formed us of error in the fitting procedure, which is the very last step in
a complex chain. There are many possible reasons why the obtained value
for α may deviate from the actual average angle of the DNA molecules on
the samples. Obviously, the results for α should not (yet) be treated on
an equal footing with those scientific facts that have been established by
multiple independent teams using different research methods and model as-
sumptions. Despite the uncertainties associated with the study, we now have
more knowledge on the tilt angle than before the study was conducted at
all. At present, α is our best estimation for the tilt angle of DNA molecules
on diamond. Although statisticians may frown upon the common practice of
ellipsometry not to calculate error bars, their absence does promote reflec-
tion on the full uncertainty, of which model uncertainty is a more profound
component as compared to fitting error. We should view the results of cases
A and B as our current best attempt at answering the research question: the
obtained answer is less certain than the foundations of optics or QM itself,
but more reliable than a mere educated guess.
4 Discussion and conclusions
4.1 Models in statistics vs. models in material science
The problem of model-assessment is not easily quantifiable: even though
various criteria (such as the goodness-of-fit relative to a distance measure)
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are expressible by numbers of merit, the reason to use this particular distance
measure rather than a different one is not quantifiable. Although one may
take into account multiple criteria to compare models, the overall result is
a partial order, not a total order. Thus, the question of putting weights on
the different criteria remains open for reflection. Moreover, it is well known
that the relevant criteria may be conflicting: to keep the computational cost
low, a model should have a minimum of free parameters; to increase the
goodness-of-fit, more parameters are better. It is clear that there is a trade-
off between these two criteria, but how do we establish a good equilibrium?
With respect to this question, material scientists follow a different approach
as compared to statisticians. In material science, the number of parameters in
a model is chosen on the basis of a physical background theory and contextual
information (on the sample and the measurement conditions), rather than
on a statistical information criterion.
Despite their clear differences, cases A and B do support a common con-
clusion. In the development of science, there is a tendency to transform qual-
itative decision schemes into quantitative algorithms; statistics has evolved
out of more basic heuristics concerning uncertainty. However, at a given point
in time, there always remain issues for which no rigorous, mathematical meth-
ods are available yet. It may be tempting to avoid discussing these issues
altogether, but we argue that discussing them in—necessarily—qualitative
terms is to be preferred over not addressing them at all.
4.2 Models and realism
Because of the close link to physical theories, material scientists tend to be
realists about their models. On closer inspection, this attitude does not
seem fully warranted: some parameters in the models employed by material
scientists are intended to correspond directly with a physical parameter, but
the accumulation of approximations in the modeling and simulation makes
the correspondence less self-evident. The distinction between empirical and
scientific models is not as clear-cut as one might have expected: any strict
classification of models in science is bound to fail.
The realistic orientation of the material scientist has drawbacks as well
as advantages. A possible drawback of the realistic orientation is that it
may hinder the material scientist to revise his model (or his interpretation
thereof) in view of conflicting evidence. An advantage of this disposition is
its strong motivational force: it suggests that there is a correct model to be
found, and that it is the goal of the scientist to find it. These observations
illustrate the complex interplay between construction and discovery in the
activity of scientific modeling.
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4.3 Speaking the same language
Notice that in case A, the research question comes before the choice of the
characterization method: it is chosen in function of the question. In case B,
however, the research question arises as a result of the chosen method: it is
a direct result of the chemical insensitivity of the STM method.
It has been observed, for instance in the context of climate modeling
(Guillemot, 2010), that experiments and simulations need to ‘speak the same
language’. In climate science, experiments and simulations are done by differ-
ent (groups of) scientists, who have different research cultures and different
traditions regarding the way in which they present their results. They report
on different quantities, making it a non-trivial task to relate their results
to each other—something which is nevertheless essential in their common
endeavor to describe and predict the state of the climate.
In the context of SE, the ‘same language’ requirement is fulfilled in a
very natural way. As we have seen, ellipsometry is an indirect method,
which always requires an extensive amount of data analysis before the spectra
reveal any interesting information. As a result, both the acquisition and the
analysis of ellipsometric data is usually performed by the same person, or
at least by members of the same research group. Both parts of the research
result in spectra that can be plotted on one and the same graph, allowing
direct comparison of the two sources of results.
In this respect, the second case is more like climate science: experimen-
tal STM is performed by one research group, whereas theoretical structure
calculations are performed by another. Typically, the theoreticians perform
DFT calculations and only report the energies associated with different struc-
tures. Relating these energy values to obtained STM images is a non-trivial
task, since the observed structures may be metastable, which means that
they need not correspond to the lowest energy structure. In our case, how-
ever, the theoreticians made their calculations speak the same language as
the experiments, by calculating STM images for the theoretical structures.
This enabled direct comparison between the two types of result and made it
possible to answer the question regarding the chemical nature of the observed
NWs and their formation process.
4.4 Process view of science
A new-born scientific result is soft and vulnerable to refutation by additional
tests. If the new result survives further scrutiny, it becomes more solid,
gradually evolving into a hard scientific fact. Most new-born scientific results
never make it into scientific facts. Not only do many results have to be
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retracted or at least revised due to further investigation, a still larger class
of results is not investigated further at all. They do not ‘grow up’ to be
facts, not because of refutation, but because of neglect by the wider research
community.
Looking critically at an isolated study in material science, as we have
done here for two cases, may give one the impression that these results are
very likely to be wrong (Ioannidis, 2005). In reality, however, the studies are
not isolated, but should be regarded as fibers of a larger body of a living,
scientific structure. The publication of a result (the product of science) is not
the end of the story (the process of science): it will have further interactions
with other parts of science, or else die. The publication of a study makes it
possible for other scientists to build on its results, or to test them further.
In both cases, if the results are wrong, the discrepancy between them and
the actual state of the world will very likely show up, upon which the results
may be refuted or adjusted in the right direction. It is true that many results
do not get any further attention, such that their possible falsehood will not
be detected. These results, however, should be regarded as dead ends, which
will soon no longer be part of the living entity that science is.
4.5 What error values do not tell us
In material physics, most data are reported with an estimation of the er-
ror; the error values may be based on the standard deviation for repeatedly
measured data and based on the goodness-of-fit parameters in the case of
simulated data that have been fitted to experimental results. In some cases,
however, it does not seem possible to compare the simulation with the ex-
perimental data in a quantitative way: this is true for the two cases we have
discussed in this paper.
Scientists feel comfortable about exact numbers, and—although there
are some notorious pitfalls in the interpretation of statistical data—we do
think it is appropriate to strive for quantitative results. The two cases we
have presented here, make use of well-defined models and use quantitative
methods to arrive at a result. This result itself, however, does not provide a
quantitative comparison between the experiments and the simulation. At this
point, scientists may start to feel uneasy: they are used to have a number to
inform them of the reliability of a result. In the absence of this information,
they have to judge the value of the final result based on different criteria. We
claim that, in the context of material science, error bars may provide a false
sense of security. For even when the errors are given, the overall reliability
of the result does not only depend on them.
Numerical error bars, if possible to compute, do help to rule-out some
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models that are clearly inappropriate for a given application. However, small
errors are not sufficient to guarantee that the model is well-chosen: the error
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of parameters in
the model, a phenomenon known as ‘overfitting’. In the absence of error
values, we are forced to think about other ways of establishing the quality
of a simulation method. This reflection shows that the intrinsic quality of
a model, its explanatory force, its predictive powers, its computability, its
applicability to a certain system, and other aspects, all play a role in the
quality of simulations in material science. These factors should be taken into
consideration, even for those studies that do report error bars.
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